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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

SALT LAKE CITY, a Utah
municipal corporation,
et al.,
Plaintiffs-Respondents,

)
)
)

BRIEF

-vs-

)

Civil No. 14689

INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION
OF FIREFIGHTERS, LOCALS
1645, 593, 1654, and 2064,
Defendants-Appellants.

)
)
)

BRIEF OF PLAINTIFFS-RESPONDENTS

NATURE OF THE CASE
Plaintiffs-Respondents brought this action seeking a declaratory judgment that the Utah Firefighters' Negotiations Act is unconstitutional because it calls for binding arbitration and
obligates elected officials to comply with decisions of a nonelected three member commission.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
Judge James S. Sawaya granted Plaintiffs-Respondents1 Motion
for Summary Judgment and held Section 34-20a-l, et seg., Utah Code
Arm. 1953, to be unconstitutional.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondents seek this court to affirm the judgment of the
lower court.
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
The uncontested facts, as established by affidavits filed
in support of the Plaintiffs-Respondents' Motion for Summary
Judgment, are as follows:
1.

The 41st Legislature in its general session passed an

adopted a law knov/n as Senate Bill 190, which was signed and
ostensively became a law of this state on or about May 13, 1975.
A copy of said statute is attached hereto as Appendix "A" for
the Court's convenient reference.

Among other provisions, this

law provides:
(a)

The plaintiff cities are required to enter into

"collective bargaining" concerning wages, hours and other
conditions of employment and execute a written contract
with Firefighter Unions.

This right is not extended to

any other municipal officer or employee, regardless of
their Union affiliation.

The bill conspicuously does not

include other Civil Service employees assigned to the
police departments of the plaintiff cities.

(Section

34-20a-l, Utah Code Ann., 1953).
(b)

If the plaintiff cities and the appropriate Fire-

fighter Unions fail to reach agreement within designated
periods, unresolved issues are submitted to an arbitration
panel or commission.

This commission is not elected; rather,

it is comprised of three individuals:

one selected by each

party and the third selected from a list provided by the
Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service.

The decision

of this arbitration commission by this law is binding and

-2~
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and final (with the force of lav; against these cities and
their elected representatives), except as to salary and
wages.
(c) Officers of the plaintiff cities can be forced
into the Firefighter Bargaining Unit, by regular vote,
but by law are prohibited from being on the negotiating
team which negotiates their wages, conditions and terms
of employment.

(See Appendix, Section 34-20a~l, Utah

Code Ann, 1953).
2.

The within action was originally filed on behalf of

Salt Lake City, Provo City, Ogden City, Murray City, Logan City,
the Utah League of Cities and Towns (an organization of approximately 200 of the 215 cities and towns of the State of Utah),
South Salt Lake City, and Harold C. Newman and Evan C. Baker,
officers of the Salt Lake City Fire Department,

Each of these

plaintiffs contend that Senate Bill 190 is unconstitutional for
the reasons more particularly hereinafter set forth.

However,

on motion of the Defendants-Respondents, the lower court dismissed the League of Cities and Towns and South Salt Lake City
as parties-plaintiff; further, the Court ordered that Locals 593,
1654, 2064 and 2148 be joined as involuntary parties-defendant
by the Plaintiffs-Respondents.
3.

(R-19-49; R-53).

Prior to the decision of the lower court determining

that Senate Bill 190 (subject of this appeal) was unconstitutional, Local 1645 of the International Association of Firefighters demanded and obtained recognition as exclusive bargaining agent for Salt Lake City firefighters.

(R-196)

Th^ pro-

posed a contract which included a manning provision, which
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requested that some firefighting units be increased from 4 to
5 members.

The requested contract also sought increased fringe

benefits, such as health and accident insurance, life insurance,
mileage allowance and related matters which have an economic
impact, but which may not be considered a "wage11 or "salary"
matter.

Further, the proposal requested equipment acquisition

and purchases which potentially could have a substantial economic
impact on the city budget.

(See, Affidavit of Lynn Marsh, and

the proposed contract attached as Exhibit "A" thereto).

(R-108-

110-126).
3.

Salt Lake City firefighters work 24 hour shifts, during

which shift they are permitted to attend to personal needs, including sleeping, eating and relaxing.

Their work schedule is

such that they work an average of 10 days per month for an average
of a 56 hour work week; this work week, as above stated, includes
their sleep time.
4.

(See, Affidavit of Chief Leon DeKorver, R-167).

If the Salt Lake City Fire Department were to go to a

52 hour week, it would require hiring approximately 90 additional
men, at a cost of approximately $1,090,000.

If a 42 hour work

week were ordered by an arbitrator, it would require the hiring
of an additional 114 men, at a total additional cost of approximately $1,378,000.
5.

(R-168).

If the Salt Lake City Fire Department were required to

implement the manning suggestion of the contract of Local 1645, it
would require the hiring of 31 additional men at an additional
cost of approximately $384,000 per annum.
6.

(R-168).

If the present level of Salt Lake City service and

manning is to be maintained, but an arbitration award were
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rendered permitting the time off for Union business, it would
require the additional hiring of several additional men at an
approximate cost of $9,000 per annum per man.
7.

(R-168).

If a binding arbitration award were entered granting

overtime to be computed on the basis suggested by the Union,
it would cost Salt Lake City taxpayers approximately $2f;,000
per year.

Further, if "trade union" type work, such as changing

tap washers, painting running boards, wall and window washing,
were eliminated from duties firefighters performed while otherwise unoccupied at the fire stations, it would cost Salt Lake City
in excess of $10,000 per year.
8,

(R-168).

Thus, a binding arbitration award granting the Union its

demands on issues (other than those involving salary or wages)
could result in a minimum economic impact on Salt Lake City of
$2,896,000 per year and require the hiring of an additional 145
employees.

(R-168)

Of course, the economic impact would multiply

in subsequent years, as these additional men progress through the
City merit pay increase program and acquire additional vacation
and sick leave benefits through longevity.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
SECTIONS 34-20a-l, ET SEQ., WHICH PERMIT A THREE
MEMBER COMMISSION OR ARBITRATION PANEL TO MAKE
AWARDS AND DECISIONS WHICH ARE BINDING ON ELECTED
OFFICIALS OF THE PLAINTIFF CITIES, IS AN UNCONSTITUTIONAL DELEGATION OF LEGISLATIVE POWERS.
A. THE BINDING ARBITRATION STATUTE VIOLATES ART.
VI, § 29, OF THE UTAH CONSTITUTION, TOGETHER WITH
WELL-SETTLED LAW PROHIBITING THE DELEGATION OF
LEGISLATIVE FUNCTIONS.
Senate Bill 190, passed by one vote on the last day of the
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1975 General Legislative Session, purports by legislative fiat,
to require the plaintiff Utah municipalities to bargain collectively with firefighters concerning "wages, hours, and other
conditions of employment."

In the event that impasse is reached

on these negotiations, all unresolved issues are to be submitted to a three member arbitration panel or commission, which
commission shall be comprised of one member selected by the municipality, one by the Union and the third selected from the list
submitted by the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service.
Significantly, the law states:
"The determination of the majority of the board of
arbitration thus established shall be final and binding
on all matters in dispute except in salary or wage
matters which shall be considered advisory only, . . . "
34-20a-9, Utah Code Ann., 1953 (Replacement Vol. 4B,
1975 Pocket Supp.) (Emphasis added)
Thus, except as to salary and wages, the Utah Legislature has
attempted to establish a commission or panel with binding powers
over local elected officials concerning all matters concerning
employee hours and other conditions of employment.

This fact is

true even though the panel is comprised of people who are not
elected and who may not even be residents of this area or, in
fact, have any personal familiarity with it whatsoever.

It is

further true despite the fact that they are not responsible or
accountable to any elected official of the City or the State.
Wisely, the constitutional framers prohibited such a shocking
invasion of the prerogatives of a democratic representative local
government and any attempt to run local affairs by appointed
persons or commission, not directly responsible to the electorate.
This provision provides:

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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"The Legislature shall not delegate to any special
commission, private corporation or association, any .
power to make, supervise, or interfere witn any
municipal improvement, money, property or effects,
whether held in trust or otherwise, to levy taxes, and
to select a capital site, or to perform any municipal
functions," Art. VI, § 29, Constitution of Utah.
(Emphasis added)
Utah case law decisions have been consistent in stating that the
purpose of this constitutional provision was to guarantee the
right of Utah cities to self-government.

Further, the provision

was to assure that Utah cities would be free from outside supervision and control. For that reason, the term "municipal
function" has been given a broad reading.

The Court has suc-

cinctly stated:
"It is to be kept in mind that the very purpose of
Section 29, Art^. VI, hereinabove quoted, prohibiting the
delegation of powers of supervision to any 'special
commission' over cities was to insure, insofar as practicable, the powers to cities and towns to manage their own
internal affairs, as previously articulated by this court,
'To hold inviolate the right of local self-government. . .'
(sic)
" . . . the term 'municipal' as used in connection with
. . . municipal function, was used in its broad sense
and would include any activity properly engaged in by the
city or municipality, whether governmental or proprietary."
State Water Pollution Control Bd. v. Salt Lake City, 6
Utah 2d 247, 311 P.2d 370, 374, also citing Logan City v.
Public Utilities Commission, 72 Utah 536, 271 P. 961, 972
(1928); Union Pacific Railroad Co. v. Public Service Commission, 103 Utah 186, 134 P.2d 469 (1943); see also,
Lighten v. Abington Tp., 9 Atl.2d 609, 613 (Pa. 1939),
which was cited with approval in State Water Pollution
Control Bd. v. Salt Lake City, id. (Emphasis added)
With virtually identical reasoning our Court voided the
Civil Auditorium and Sports Arena Act.

The Court held that the

Act created a special commission in violation of Art. VI, § 29,
of the Utah Constitution; it stated:
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"We are convinced that the framers of our state constitution .wisely anticipated the inroads that might be
cut in „the structure of "local] representative government,
which fundamentally is composed of officials elected by
those closest to government, the electors, when they
judiciously assisted on incorporating Art. VI, Sec. 29,
as a must in our constitution. We hold that this act
attempted to create a special commission offensive to
the plain terms of Art. VI, Sec. 29, Backman v. Salt Lake
County, 13 Ut.2d 412, 375 P.2d 756 (1962). (Emphasis added)
The Court in this Backman decision outlined the conditions which
were deemed to be necessary to create a commission to perform
municipal functions, in violation of Art. VI, § 29, of the
Constitution; it stated:
"Three conditions are necessary to violate the provisions: (Art. VI, Sec. 29) Delegation of a private
commission of power to 2) interfere with municipal
property or 3) to perform a municipal function*"
Backman v. Salt Lake County, id. at p. 760.
The Court then held that the recreation Sports Arena Board was
such a special commission which offended this constitutional
provision.
Specifically, the Utah Supreme Court has applied Art. VI,
§ 29 of the Utah Constitution to labor matters.

This case

involved an issue as to whether a decision to reinstate a city
employee by a City Appeal Board should be affirmed (despite a
subsequent City Board of Commissioners1 decision to terminate
w that employee).

The Court reasoned from Art. VI, § 29 and held

that the Appeal Board's decision was not binding on the City
Commission.

Thus, the Court upheld a dismissal by the City

Commission and specifically stated:
"The responsibility for the operation of the city
government rests with the City Commission who are elected
by and responsible to the public. It therefore seems
reasonable to assume that the legislature intended that
it have the final voice in policy-making decisions as the
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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statute expressly states. If the action of the Appeal
Board in reinstating an employee were final as plaintiff
contends, the ability of the City Commission to fulfill
the responsibilities imposed upon it would be seriously
impaired. It was undoubtedly to prevent such impairment, and to keep responsibility where it belongs that
our Constitution provides that the legislature may not
delegate municipal functions to any special commission.
Furthermore, if the legislature had intended the statute
to be so applied that the Appeal Board, a majority of
which are fellow employees, should have final authority
to make such a determination, there may well be a serious
doubt as to whether this constitutional provision (Art.
VI, § 29) would be infringed." Gord v. Salt Lake City,
20 Ut.2d 138, 434 P.2d 449, 453 (1967).
The Court thereafter chose not to invalidate the statute
under discussion, but construed it to avoid the constitutional
conflict.

However, the rationale clearly indicates that the

terms and conditions of employment are "municipal functions"
within the meaning of Art. VI, § 29, of the Utah Constitution.
There is little question that, if the statute establishing Appeal
Boards could not have been construed to be merely advisory to the
Commission, the law would have been declared void.
Other courts considering this problem have likewise ruled
that tenure, compensation and working conditions are municipal
and legislative functions.

The Missouri Supreme Court stated

this principal as follows:
"The whole matter of qualifications, tenure, compensation and working conditions for any public service,
involves the exercise of legislative powers. Except to
the extent that all the people have themselves settled
any of these matters by writing them into the constitution,
they must be determined by their chosen representatives
who constitute the legislative body. It is a familiar
principal of constitutional law that the legislature cannot
delegate its legislative powers and any attempted delegation
thereof is void . . . . Thus, qualifications, tenure,
compensation, and working conditions of public officers
and employees are wholly matters of lawmaking. . . . "
City of Springfield v. Clouse, 206 S.W.2d 539 (Mo., 1947),
cited with approval in City of Aurora, Colorado v. Aurora
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Firefighters Protective Association, et al., District
Court in and for the County of Adams, Colorado, Civil No.
26743, decided April 22, 1976, and copied at R-152.
Thus, the writer respectfully suggests that the creation
of a three member commission called a Board of Arbitration,
whose decisions are final and binding upon the elected representatives of the people, regarding all matters relating to Fire
Department operations and procedures (excepting only wage and
salary matters), is a usurpation of the prerogatives and the
municipal functions.

These functions are vested exclusively, by

the Utah Constitution, in the elected officials of the plaintiff
cities; as such, the binding arbitration feature of this statute
is patently unconstitutional and should be so ruled by this court.
Many other decisions which have given thoughtful consideration
to binding arbitration laws, have likewise ruled it to be in violation of well established law which prohibits the delegation of
legislative functions and/or of constitutional provisions similar
to Art. VI, § 29.
A.

Some such decisions are as follows:

Washington.

In a well researched and reasoned opinion

our sister state, Washington, held unconstitutional an amendment
to a city charter, which provided for binding arbitration concerning labor disputes between firemen and the City.

This court

observed:
"'Contract clauses, requiring the arbitration of disputes or grievances between the municipality and the
Union by 'neutral and impartial persons' and agreeing
that the results will be binding, have been held invalid
on two grounds: (1) that city officers may not bargain
away or delegate to others the exercise of authority or
discretion confided in themselves by law; (2) that since
disputes may concern the hiring or discharge of employees,
which matters may be governed by the merit system or
civil service laws, city officers may not consent to any
other method of dealing with such matters in the absence
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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of statutory authority. * * * f,f State v. Johnson, 278
P.2d 663, 664. (Other citations omitted)
This Washington Court also cited with approval Springfield
v. Clouse, above cited, concerning the illegality of binding
arbitration provisions relating to public employees; it observed:
"'Under our form of government, public office or employment never has been and cannot become a matter of bargaining
and contract. (Citations omitted) This is true because the
whole matter of qualifications, tenure, compensation and
working conditions for any public service, involves the
exercise of legislative powers/ Except to the extent that
all the "people have themselves settled any of these matters
by writing them into the Constitution, they must be determined by their chosen representatives who constitute the
legislative body. It is a familiar principle of constitutional law that the legislature cannot delegate its legislative powers and any attempted delegation thereof is void.
11 Am.Jur. 921, Sec. 214, 16 C.J.S., Constitutional Law, §
133, (page 337); A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. U.S., 295
U.S. 495, 55 S.Ct. 837, 79 L.Ed. 1570. If such powers
cannot be delegated they surely cannot be bargained or contracted away; and certainly not by any administrative or
executive officers who cannot have any legislative powers.
Although executive and administrative officers may be
vested with a certain amount of discretion and may be
authorized to act or make regulations in accordance with
certain fixed standards, nevertheless the matter of making
such standards involves the exercise of legislative powers.
Thus qualifications, tenure, compensation and working conditions of public officers and employees are wholly matters
of lawmaking and cannot be the subject of bargaining or
contract.'" State v. Johnson, id at p. 664, citing City of
Springfield v. Clouse, 206 S.W.2d 539, 554, (Mo. 1947).
(Emphasis added)
The Washington Court correctly defined the issue and held
the binding arbitration law invalid as an illegal delegation of
legislative power; it said:
"Can the legislative body abdicate its responsibility
and turn it over to a board of arbitrators whose decision
will be binding upon the legislative body and the firemen?
Clearly it has no legal right to do so. The theory of
delegation of authority is that the person or group to
whom authority has been delegated, acts for and as the
agent of the person or group delegating such authority.
That is not the situation here. Here the council would

-11-
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be stepping out of the picture entirely and the arbitration board would be performing a function which, by law,
is the responsibility of the council." State v. Johnson,
id. at p. 666.^ (Emphasis added)
B.

Pennsylvania.

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that

a State statute purporting to grant an arbitration panel binding
powers on a city legislative body was invalid and unconstitutional,
The Court reasoned from Art. 3, Section 20, of the Pennsylvania
Constitution, which is virtually identical to Art. VI, § 29, of
the Utah Constitution.

This Pennsylvania Constitutional pro-

vision provided:
"The General Assembly shall not delegate to any special
commission, private corporation or association, any power
to make, supervise or interfere with any municipal improvement, money, property, or effects, whether held in trust
or otherwise, or to levy taxes or perform any municipal
function whatever." Art. 3, Sec. 20, Pennsylvania Constitution.
The Court then summarized the law concerning delegation of legislative functions as follows:
"If the delegation of power is to make the law, which
involves a discretion of what the law shall be, then the
power is non-delegable. If the conferred authority is
the power or discretion to execute the law already determined and circumscribed, then the delegation is unobjectionable. If we are correct in this interpretation of
the rule, then there is no question but that the power to
fix municipal salaries and to create a pension plan is
non-delegable under our Constitution, for these matters,
as have been mentioned above, are purely municipal
functions. We are of the opinion, therefore, that if the
Act of 1947 makes the findings of the panel of concilia'tors binding upon the city insofar as the creation of
^ o t e : At page 14 of Appellants' brief is cited an apparently
unpublished county court decision. Only a summary of that
decision is available at the source cited; in any event, it
neither overrules the Johnson case or its reasoning.
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municipal ordinances is concerned, then that portion of
the Act which so states is unconstitutional and cannot be
enforced in this proceeding." Erie Firefighters Local No,
293 v. Gardiner, 178 A.2d 691, 695 (Pa., 1962).
Thereafter, Pennsylvania specifically amended this provision
of its Constitution to permit binding arbitration and, thus,
binding arbitration was subsequently upheld as valid in that
state.

See, Harney v. Russo, 225 A.2d 560 (Pa., 1969).

C.

South Dakota.

Of identical reasoning and import is a

recent decision of our sister state, South Dakota.

This case >.s

on all fours with the case before the bar and involved a charter
provision mandating binding arbitration, through a three member
panel.

Like Utah, South Dakota's Constitution contained a pro-

vision which made it unlawful to delegate legislative power and
interfere with municipal functions pursuant to provision of Art.
Ill, § 26, of its Constitution.

Like the Utah decisions above

cited, that court noted that its constitutional provision had
been passed when the framers saw a need "to cure the evil 'of
interference with municipal functions by the legislature of this
state.1"

Thus, the South Dakota court stated:

"We hold, therefore, that under the language of Art.
Ill, § 26, of this State's Constitution SDLC 9-14A-18
(binding arbitration for firefighters) is clearly
unconstitutional." City of Sioux Falls v. Sioux Falls
Firefighters, Local 814, 234 N.W.2d 35, 38 (S.D., 1975).
D.

California.

The California Court of Appeals, First

District, has recently reversed the Superior Court ruling; this
appellate court held void a memorandum agreement between San Francisco and its firemen, which called for binding arbitration.

The

Court stated that the existence of an arbitration clause in a labor
contract was an unauthorized delegation of legislative power, preserved by City charter in the elected officials.
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Firefighters Local 798 v. City and County of San Francisco, 129
Cal.Rep. 39 (Cal.Ct.App., 1976).

In so holding, it correctly

distinguished Firefighters Union v. City of Vallejo, 526 P.2d
971 (Cal., 1974), cited as authority by appellants at page 14
of their brief.
As the San Francisco case noted, the Vallejo decision merely
gave effect to a charter provision, which specifically authorized
arbitration.

The San Francisco case found the City had no power

to negotiate a contract for binding arbitration, in that the
matters would involve the exercise of judgment and discretion
which were in the nature of a "public trust" and could not be
delegated.

It further found that the binding arbitration clause

was defective in that there werfe no sufficient standards or "safeguards" to prevent abuse; thus, in any event, it was an unlawful
delegation of the legislative function.
E.

Oregon.

Id. at p. 303.

In 1975, the Court of Appeals of Oregon struck

down a State statute requiring binding arbitration in labor matters.
It ruled that provisions of the Oregon Constitution granted home
rule powers to cities and held that the binding arbitration statute
was an invasion into an area which was a matter of paramount city
interest.

Therefore, a City charter which reserved in the city

the right to regulate city labor, took precedence over the State
binding arbitration statute; it stated:
"The central question is what legislative powers do
the home rule amendments reserve to cities.
" . . . 'The real test is not whether the state or the
city has an interest in the matter, for usually they
both have, but whether the state's interest or that of
the city is paramount.1" City of Beaverton v. International
Ass'n of Fire Fighters, 531 P.2d 730, 731 (Or. C/A, 1975).

-14-
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The Court then reasoned that the administration of the fire department and related matters were municipal functions whose paramount
interest rested with the city and not the state; it stated:
1,1

If the legislative assembly has the power to deprive
the people of municipalities of self-government in this
respect, it would be difficult to imagine an area of
activity engaged in by the city which could not be
similarly controlled,1" City of Beaverton v. International
Ass'n of Fire Fighters, id. at p. 735, citing KeiniQ v.
Milwaukie, et al., 373 P.2d 686.
This Oregon Court of Appeals decision was not accepted for review
by the Oregon Supreme Court, which apparently approved the holding.
Other decision of the Oregon Supreme Court have similarly
affirmed the right of local governments to manage their municipal
affairs as explained in the Beaverton case; further, Oregon has
clearly sided with the authority above provided, which prohibits
the delegation of legislative functions.

In a related issue, the

Oregon Supreme Court articulately stated that the Uniform Electrical Code, approved by the American Standards Association, did
not become the standards of Oregon without legislative action.
observed that a delegation of authority to non-elected political
bodies by automatic incorporation of those standards without
legislative review was illegal and stated:
"No doubt its objectives are meritorious and its activities productive of much good. But the constitution does
not sanction the delegation of legislative power to any
private agency no matter how well qualified such agency
may be. It must be borne in mind that the 'beneficial
aims, however great or well directed, can never serve in
lieu of constitutional power. 1 " Hillman v. Northern
Wasco County People Utilities District, 323 P.2d 664, 674
(Or., 1968), citing Carter v. Carter Coal Company, 298
U.S. 238, 80 L.Ed. 1160.
Thus, our sister state Oregon has clearly sided with the
proposition that the operation of a fire department is a matter
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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It

of predominant local concern and involves municipal functions.
Those functions, therefore, are not appropriately a matter of
delegation through some ad hoc commission, vested with power to
bind elected officials to their decisions.
F

-

Colorado.

The most recent decision concerning this

issue comes from Colorado.

Here the Supreme Court of Colorado

struck down a binding arbitration city charter amendment which
required good faith bargaining and arbitration on all matters,
terms and conditions of employment.

The Court held the compulsory

binding arbitration clause of the city charter an unlawful
delegation of legislative power.

In so doing, it affirmed a

previous 1962 decision, holding that a public employer

" . . .

cannot be forced to arbitrate disputes arising from a collective
bargaining agreement."

This court then correctly stated:

"A contrary holding in our view, would seriously
conflict with the basic tenets of a representative
government. Fundamental among these tenets is the
precept that officials engaged in governmental
decision making (e.g., setting budgets, salaries,
and other terms and conditions of public employment)
must ha accountable to the citizens they represent.
Binding arbitration removes these decisions from the
aegis of elected representatives, placing them in
the hands of an outside person who has no accountability to the public." The Greeley Police Union, et
al., v. City Council of Greeley, et al., 553 P.2d 790,
(Col., 197 6 ) , citing with approval Dearborn Fire
Fighters Union v. City of Dearborn, 2 31 N.W.2d 226
(197 5 ) , opinion of Mr. Justice Levin; Fellows v.
,
LaTroncia, 377 P.2d 547 (Colo., 1962).
Thereafter, the Court cited Art. V, § 35 of the Colorado
Constitution which is similar to the Utah Constitution, Art. V I ,
§29, and prohibits the Legislature from delegating to a "special
commission the power to interfere with municipal government."
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Thus, the binding arbitration charger provision was voided as
an unlaw delegation of legislative functions belonging exclu2
sively to the elected representatives of city government.
G. Michigan. The Appellants-Unions cite Dearborn Fire
Fighters Union Local 412, v. City of Dearborn, 231 N.W.2d 226
(Mich., 1975) as authority for the proposition that binding and
compulsory arbitration has been upheld; however, any fair reading
of that case demonstrates that more accurately it supports the
respondents' position.

Judge Levin articulates the cause against

binding arbitration as an unlawful delegation of legislative
functions in perhaps the best reasoned, researched and written
opinion of any case discovered by the writer.

Contrary to the

representation of the brief published by the Appellant Unions,
Judge Levin concludes that the binding arbitration labor statute
was unconstitutional and stated:
"1969 P.O.A. (312). (binding arbitration statute) is
unconstitutional-H Dearborn Fire Fighters Unidn Local
412 v. City of Dearborn, id. at p. 243.
However, that decision was given prospective application only.
Judge Levin was joined in his conclusion by Judge Kavanagh.
A thir<J judge in a separate opinion, upheld the decision
applying the prospective effect of that decision; this Judge
held the arbitration provisions valid on the facts as applied to
that case only because the arbitrator was appointed by and responsible to the electorate through an elected official, the governor.
2
*Note: Huff v. Mayor and City Council Colorado Springs, cited
at p. 14 of defendant's brief, did not deal with any issue
regarding binding arbitration and does not stand for the proposition for which it was cited by the appellant; rather, the 1976
Greeley case, above cited, cites Huff and notes no conflict
the Howard
W. Hunter
Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
between it Digitized
and byits
1976
decision.
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See, Judge Williams; opinion commencing id. at page 252. The
only other judge ruling on the case, wrote a separate dissenting
opinion; he would have upheld the statute as constitutional,
both as applied and per se.
Clearly, this Michigan court would have ruled the Utah
statute unconstitutional by at least a 3 to 4 margin; this conclusion is correct because our arbitration panel is not appointed
by or responsible to any elected official.

They are totally

autonomous with the "neutral" appointment

coming from a list

supplied by Federal Mediation Service and none are responsible
or accountable to any elected official.
However, more important than the plurality decision is the
astute insight given by the well researched opinion of Judge Levin,
which was subsequently cited with approval in cases voiding arbitration statutes similar to the Utah law under discussion.

See,

Greeley Police Union, et al. v. City Council of Greeley, supra.
Regarding the real question at issue, Judge Levin cited Professor
George W. Taylor with approval and noted:
"'Some persons would 'simplify1 matters by 'forthrightly adopting some form of compulsory arbitration
in all political jurisdictions. This course, until now,
has be£n almost universally rejected in the private
sector, because it would undermine private agreementmaking, which is the cornerstone of the enterprise
system. Compulsory arbitration is not more, and perhaps
less, appropriate in the government sector. For reasons
expressed heretofore, a strike of government employees
interferes with the orderly performance of the functions
of representative government. Compulsory arbitration
is a greater threat—it entails a delegation to 'outsiders'
to the authority assigned by the electorate to elected
officials, who are subject to the checks and balances of
our governmental institutions.'" Dearborn Fire Fighters
Union v. City of Dearborn, id. at p. 233, citing Taylor,
Public Employment: Strikes or Procedures, 2 0 Industrial
Labor Relations Rev., 617, 632 (1967). (Emphasis added)
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Judge Levin then cites with approval Bernstein, as follows:
"'(C)ompulsory arbitration amounts to a delegation of
the responsibilities of public management and of the
law makers to outsiders. In my view, this is incompatible
with the basic, principles of representative governmen.:,
In fact, it can become almost a convenience to duck hard
issues by passing them to a board that is only temporarily
in office and that is not responsible to the electorate.1"
Dearborn Fire Fighters Union v. City of Dearborn, id. at p.
233, citing Bernstein, Alternatives to the Strike in Public
Labor Relations, 85 Harv. L. Rev. 459, 467 (1971).
(Emphasis added)
It is correctly noted in the Dearborn decision that although
arbitration awards may not necessarily result in raising taxes by
an arbitrator, the decision may well affect the allocation of
governmental expenditures within the political unit.

The Judge

then astutely states:
111

By relying upon arbitration, a governmental official
can avoid an unpleasant decision for which he would otherwise be politically accountable.1" Dearborn Fire Fighters
Union v. City of Dearborn, id, at p. 236.
In summary, the Judge states:
"(The binding arbitration process), is not consonant
with.the proper governace and is not an appropriate
method for resolving legislative-political issues in a
representative democracy." Dearborn Fire Fighters Union
v. City of Dearborn, id., at p. 236.
As the foregoing amply demonstrates, the assertion of
Appellants at page 13 of this brief, that only one jurisdiction
has voided binding arbitration statutory provisions, is a generous
misstatement of fact.

The massive citation of cases on pages 13

and 14 of Appellants1 brief, with few exceptions, is "puff."
Most of the cases do not stand for the proposition asserted, and
in some instances, stand for directly opposite holdings and
positions.
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The Appellants' "formidable line" of authority more correctly represents a tangle of duplicitus citations from a single
jurisdiction (e.g., 5 citations from New York alone) or citations
relating to entirely different subjects, than the issue of compulsory binding arbitration.

However, rather than clutter the

main body of this brief with rebuttal, the cases not heretofore
distingushed will be discussed in the following note, in order
that the court will not be misled by the facade of Appellants1
"Maginot Line."3
The wisdom of these cases striking down binding arbitration
panels and, thus, preserving accountability in elected officials
for the operation of government, is best illustrated by the 1975
J

Note: PROFESSIONAL FIRE FIGHTERS, INC. V. CITY OF LOS ANGELES,
384 P.2d 158 (1963). This case did not involve binding arbitration; rather, this case involved the charge of discrimination,
that is, the right to join or refrain from joining a labor
organization. See footnote 1-4, id. at 384 P.2d 159-161, 169.
Further, the case has no relevance to the case before the bar
because Salt Lake City is not a charter city and the issues
presented here are in no way similar.
CITY OF BIDDEFORD TEACHERS ASSOCIATION, 304 A.2d 387 (Me., 1973).
In this case, a badly divided court stated that the binding
arbitration statute under discussion was void, lacking adequate
standards for legislative delegation. Three members of the six
judge panel stated:
"We hold that the legislature's attempt to delegate
to the arbitrators binding determination of labor disputes between teachers and their public employers is
void for lack of adequate standards." City of Biddeford
v. Biddeford Teachers Ass'n., id. at p. 40.
The other three members dissented from this holding and, thus,
the decision stands for little, particularly in view of the fact
that no constitutional provision similar to Utah's reserving
municipal function to the city, was under discussion. In addition, it must be noted the other. Maine case cited held only
that Maln.e law permitted city to sign an arbitration contract.
It did not mandate binding arbitration as is the case in the Utah
law under discussion. Rockland Professional Firefighters Ass'n.
v. City of Rockland,
261 A.2d 418 (Me., 1976).
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arbitration award of Oakland, California.

In this case, a charter

provision passed in 1973 provided for compulsory and binding
arbitration, after a negotiating impasse had been reached by police
or firemen.

In November of 1974, impasse was reached and an arbi-

trator was selected to make decisions concerning three major issues(a) a three percent salary increase over the City's last offer,
(b) hours to be worked by firefighters, and (c) a manning issue.
The arbitrator found for the Union on all issues; however,
of specific relevance to the case before the bar, is the fact that
the arbitrator ordered that the duty hours for firefighters be
reduced to an average of 54 hours, effective July 1, 1975.

(Like

the Utah situation, these hours including sleep and other time used
Note 3 cont.
SCHOOL DISTRICT OF SEWARD EDUCATION ASSOCIATION V. SCHOOL DISTRICT
OF SEWARD, 199 N.W.2d 752 (Neb., 1972). This case merely stands
for the proposition that Nebraska has a unique constitutional
provision which specifically provides for a termination of controversies in their school system through a court of industrial
relations. See, id. at p. 756.
,
CITY OF MIDWEST V. CRAVENS, 532 P.2d 829 (Ok., 1975). Here, the
court specifi6ally noted that the law did not require binding
arbitration and, hence, did not deprive the local government
" . . . the right to manage and control its fire department. . .";
rather, the law merely provided a uniform labor practice through
the state.
Id., at p. 833.
»

HARNEY V. RUSSO, 255 A.2d 560 (Pa., 1969). See, discussion, supra
at p. 12. Like Nebraska, this case involved the unique constitutional amendment, specifically authorizing binding arbitration
in that state.
LUHRS V. CITH OF PHOENIX, 83 P.2d 283 (Ariz., 1938). This case
did not involve binding arbitration, but involved the validity of
a state minimum wage and pension fund statute. It has no relevance
to the issues pending before the court concerning delegation of
legislative powers or functions to an arbitration panel.
FIREFIGHTERS UNION, LOCAL 1186 V. CITY OF VALLEJO, 526 P.2d 971
(Cal., 1974). This case does mention, without discussion or comment, binding arbitration statutes; however, as construed, the
case only stands for the enforcement of a city charter provision
authorizing collective bargaining. See discussion at page 13,
supra.
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for personal needs on a 24-hour shift basis. L~:Further, he reduced
the duty time to 52 hours as of January 1, 1976.

This order alone

resulted in the requirement of hiring 48 additional firemen.
In addition, the arbitrator reversed the" elected councilmens'
decision and ordered that each fire company was to be manned by
5 instead of 4 men.

This decision resulted in restoring 36

positions eliminated by the elected representatives of Oakland.
Also, he directed that additional firemen would be hired to provide routine relief for leaves of absence.

This order resulted

in the requirement of hiring 18 firemen, in addition to the other
36 positions which were reinstated.
The arbitrator, also awarded substantial increases in health
insurance benefits, uniform allowances, overtime and holiday pay.
Note 3 cont.
HUFF V. MAYOR AND CITY COUNCIL OF COLORADO SPRINGS, 512 P.2d
632 (Colo., 1963). As previously stated, this case does not
deal with arbitration or assignment of legislative functions
to arbitration panel; rather, it dealt with the right of the
City to establish a pension plan, which conflicted with State law,
BOARD OF TRUSTEE OF P. AND F. R. F. V. CITY OF PADUCAH, 333 S.W.
2d 515 (Ky., 1960). This case stands for the proposition that
Kentucky rejects " . . . positively and unequivocally, the theory
that a right of local self-government inheres to Kentucky municipalities." Id. at p. 518. In addition to that position which
our constitution and case law rejects, the case did not deal
with binding arbitration or any issue relevant to the case,
before the bar. Rather, it dealt with the validity of a State
statute establishing a State retirement fund for police and firemen. Likewise, the other Kentucky case cited, Kentucky Municipal
League v. the Commonwealth of Kentucky Department of Labor, 535
S.W.2d 198 (Ky.Ct.App., 1975), did not deal with the issues
before this court. That case involved a challenge to the State's
right to set a minimum wage of $1.30 per hour and establish a
40 hour work week for employees exempted from the Fair Labor
Standards Act under Federal law. Hence, there was no issue of
delegation of legislative prefogatives or binding arbitration
panels, not responsible to any elected body.
DETROIT POLICE OFFICERS'S ASS'N V. DETROIT , 213 N.W.2d 803
(Wis., 1974). This case obviously does not resolve the binding
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In addition, he awarded an agency shop, inclu.c3i.ng a grievance
procedure which was itself binding and final, and included a
virtual veto power over all future changes in fire department
rules and regulations.

He, also, provided the Union with the

right to reopen negotiations within a month/
This arbitration award was made binding on the elected
officials and was made despite a projected three (3) million
dollar fiscal 1974-1975 deficit projection.

In fact, the award

alone was projected to cost the City of Oakland approximately
2.5 million dollars /.. and the elected officials were left with
the problem of solving the fiscal crisis by levying additional
taxes or cutting services.

Of this award, Mr. Gerald E. Newfarmer

correctly noted:
"The arbitration award is clearly a crushing blow
to the City of Oakland. The 3% excess salary increase
and the addition of 102 firemen to the City staff
contribute to a total fiscal impact of more than 30%
of the city fire payroll, without even mentioning the
almost certain affect on policemen looking forward
with new-found eagerness to 1975 negotiations. Of
equal importance over the longer term will be the
crippling affects of the new constraints on the ability
of management (council and administration) to determine
the level of service and to manage its delivery."
Oakland Gets First Arbitration Award." Western City,
March, *1975 at p. 16, 33. Also see, discussion of
Judge Levin concerning this eventuality in Dearborn
Fire Fighters Union Local 412 v. City of Dearborn,
Supra, .at P. :<lt6, (Emphasis added)
Note 3 cont.
• '
n^-,,arbitration issue or there would be no need for the 1975
np^rhnrn case discussed supra. In fact, this dispute was one
involving the issue of whether "residency" or "retirement"
were properly subjects of labor "good faith bargaining." The
case does not have a holding concerning binding arbitration
panels or illegal legislative delegation.
The New York, Wyoming.and Rhode Island cases do not uphold the
validity of public employee or binding arbitration labor
statutes. However, as discussed in Point IB, New York would
have voided the Utah statute as an illegal delegation, without
proper standards.
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Salt Lake City, and the other plaintiff-cities, likewise,
could be in a similar position.

As noted more particularly in

the Statement of Facts and the uncontroverted affidavits of record,
an arbitration award favorable to the Union on a contract already
presented to Salt Lake City, could result in liabilities totalling
$2,896,000 and hiring 145 additional men.

These figures do not

even consider "wage and salary" issues!
With considerable insight, the cases above cited have avoided
these types of problems for their jurisdictions by declaring labor
sponsored legislation for binding arbitration to be unconstitutional.
Thus, these States have preserved accountability and responsibility
for managing the public's business in the elected officials where
it belongs. As Judge Soden succinctly observed:
"Harmony is not promoted by compulsion, resolution
is not wrought by legioning, and public employee strikes
are already illegal. The task of finding other reasonable ways to achieve the fstate's goals1 in the public
labor section (other than binding arbitration) with lesser
burden on constitutionally protected activity are essentially legislative. These ways must be found and developed
with renewed awareness of the essential fundamentals of
our political heritage — the consent of the governed."
City of Amsterdam v. Helsby, 362 N.Y.Supp.2d 698 (1974),
reversed 332 N.E.2d 290 (N.Y., 1975).
*»

The writer whole-heartedly agrees with this Lower New York
Court and the others above cited.

Binding arbitration is not

compatible with the legislative functions of determining quantity,
quality and levels of governmental services.

Further, the assess-

ment of taxes and the expenditure thereof are inexorably connected.
These questions rest exclusively with the elected representatives
of the people.

-24-
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Further, as is clearly illustrated in the Oakland case,
salaries and wages are not necessarily the major'economic and •
service issues.

The cost of fringe benefits, holidays, the hours

worked, manning requirements, overtime provisions and other
matters (which are not wages or salaries) may have a devastating
fiscal impact upon the City and its budget.

Decisions made on

these issues can determine the rate of taxation, the quantity,
quality and type of services rendered by the City.
These decisions under our representative form of government
must remain with elected officials.

Otherwise, the real deci-

sions concerning local government will be made by panels of

.

arbitrators and the elected officials will merely be puppets,
effectuating their decisions.

This cannot and must not be the

law of Utah.
Decisions contra to the foregoing analysis and authority are
not well reasoned or authoritative.

For example, Wyoming and *

Rhode Island have upheld binding arbitration statuses; however,
they have been severely criticized by judges and commentators.
They ethereally state that binding arbitration provisions are mere
policy issues resolved by the Legislature, without seriously
addressing the illegal delegation problems, or they mysteriously
convert the arbitration panel into agents of the Legislature. See,
Warwick v. Warwick Regular Firemen's Assfn, 437 P.2d 295 (Wyo.r
1968) ; Providence v. Local 799, International Ass'n of Firefighters,
304 At.2d 93.
Professor Sylvester Petro summarized the absurdities of these
positions as follows:.
"It is true that some courts are formally accepting
private arbitration of public-sector disputes, using all
kinds of makeshift analyses to avoid the obviously unconDigitized by thedelegation
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is no unconstitutional delegation because the arbitrator ..
is given executive , not legislative, power to resolve
a dispute involving local firemen—as though the name
could make any real difference! Other courts have
struggled to uphold public-sector labor-dispute arbitration on equally absurd grounds. Thus, the Rhode
Island court has held that the arbitrators become public
officers or agents of the legislature: 'Collectively,'
said the court, 'these officers constitute an administrative or governmental agency. This Orwelliam abuse
of the meaning of the term 'agency, ' though obvious, still
must be exposed for what it is. An agent is one who serves
his principal; not one who commands. An agent follows
directions; he does not give orders. To call neutral
arbitrators (in a dispute between a union and a government)
agents of the government makes a mockery of the whole
arbitration process and deals simple reason and common
sense a staggering blow.
"A recent decision of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
demonstrates how far the (some) courts are willing to go
in subordinating popular and legislative sovereignty to
arbitration of public-sector disputes. The case involved
the constitutionality of a statute compelling arbitration
of police and firefighter labor disputes. Admittedly,
the statute lacked standards effectively controlling the
arbitrator's award (for what 'standards' could there be?)
Furthermore, it was recognized that the award might force
an increase in local taxes, notwithstanding the political
consensus of the community and existing debt limits for
the city. In enforcing the award the court said that, if
necessary, it would itself order the city to raise local
taxes in order to satisfy the arbitration award.
"Contemplating such a decision, one wonders at the
conditions which could bring about so thoroughgoing a
perversion of our constitutional system. Nothing can be
clearer .than that, in our system, the courts do not have
taxing ^powers — unless it is the proposition that the
taxing power does not belong to private arbitrators, with
or without court assistance." Petro, "Sovereignty and
Compulsory Public-Sector Bargaining." 10 Hake Forest
L.Rev. 25, 104-105 (1974). (emphasis added)
Judge Levin also noted the shallowness of these decisions;
stated:
"The Supreme Court of Wyoming avoided the real issue
by refusing to characterize as a delegation of legislative power the arbitrators power to decide 'wages, hours
of service, and working conditions.'" Dearborn Fire
Fighters Union v. City of Dearborn, id. at p. 226.
(Emphasis added)
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Concerning the Rhode Island decision, he stated:
"The Rhode Island Supreme Court acknowledged that the
arbitrator's 'power to fix salaries of public employees
is clearly a legislative function', but analyzed a challenge to the constitutionality of the delegation in a
manner which has been correctly criticized as 'wholly
tautological.'" id. at p. 231 and commentators cited
therein. (Emphasis added)
* * *

"Such nominalistic reasoning both begs the question
and reduces the analysis of the issue to a reason-free
debate over labels. Such reasoning could countenance
the syllogism that all enactments of the Legislature are
constitutional because the Legislature cannot pass an
unconstitutional law." id. at p. 232, and cited with
approval in Greeley Police Union, et al., v. City Council
of Greeley, Colo., et al., supra at p. 790.
Likewise, the New York Court failed to analyze the taxation
without representation question at all.

However, interestingly

it found no illegal delegation because of the "detailed" and
"specific guidelines" provided for the arbitrators in the New
York statute.

The statute was upheld because: ". . . most impor-

tant, the detailed basis upon which awards are to be determined."
City of Amsterdam v. Helsby, id. at p. 299-300, n. 4.
added).

(Emphasis

Clearly, the New York Court would have ruled that the

Utah statute lacked these definate legislative guidelines for
delegation, and its decision would have been different if it had
the Utah law before it.

This issue of standards necessary for a

valid delegation by a legislative body will be discussed in
Point IB, Infra.
However, at this juncture, it is perhaps appropriate to
discuss appellants' assertion that because labor matters may
involve a question of state-wide concern. Art. VI, § 29 has . .. .
no application.

It would appear to the writer from reading
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Appellant's brief, that he is under the impression that Salt Lake
City is a charter city, which it is not.

Further, there is no

issue in this case involving a conflict between a state statute
and a charter provision.

Therefore, the authority cited which

discusses when a city charter provision may take precedence over
a statute is irrelevant to this case.

However, even if it were,

the better reasoned cases make such a decision based on which
interest "predominates;" that is, the city is not deprived of
home rule just on the basis of whether or not the matter is of
f

fetate-wide concern."

See, City of Beaverton v. International

Ass'n of Fire Fighters, id. and quoted supra at p. 14.
Aside from the foregoing observation, the writer has no
quarrel with the general assertion of appellant, that a Utah city
is a creature of the Legislature and that (absent constitutional
grants of right) a city only has those powers and functions which
have been delegated to the City by the Legislature or those that
necessarily flow from other powers so delegated.

See, Stevenson

v. Salt Lake City, 7 Ut.2d 28, 317 P.2d 597 (1957).

Further,

Respondent-Salt Lake City, has no quarrel with the general proposi
tion that matters of state-wide concern can be the subject of a
general state-wide statute, such as the State Retirement Act or
a law requiring cities to maintain fire departments.
However, from those truisms, one cannot completely neuter
Art. VI, § 29, of the Utah Constitution, which guarantees local
self government in Utah cities.

Defendants-Appellants' argument

to the contrary can be reduced to the following syllogism:
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(1)

A city is a creature of the State and has only

those powers and functions which have been delegated to
it by the Legislature;
(2)

The Legislature can amend or repeal any function

given to a city by enacting a general law; thus, a
"municipal function" is that which is stated as such in
general legislative enactments;
(3)

Therefore, notwithstanding Art. VI, § 29, of the

Utah Constitution, the Legislature can appoint a special
commission to perform any function, by legislatively
declaring that the issue is no longer a "municipal
function."
Such logic reminds one of the reasoning which practically read
the IX and X Amendments out of the U.S. Constitution, until the
recent decision of National League of Cities, et al,, v. Usery,
95 S.Ct. 2465, 49 L.ed.2d 45 (1976).
Certainly, this court has never adopted such circuitous
and fallacious reasoning as that urged by appellant; rather, it
has consistently protected cities in their right of self-government from the usurpation of these functions by the tyranny of
appointed commissioners, with binding powers over elected officials.
Further, it is to be noted that it is one thing for the state to
subject the cities to regulation or expense through the establishment of a state-wide retirement fund, minimum wage, or hours
of work provisions.

It is quite a different matter to give

cities responsibility for setting taxes, wages, hours and terms
and conditions of employment (above as stated minimum standard)
and thereby define them as "municipal functions," but with the
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same legislative pen create an arbitration panel or commission
with ultimate power to perform them.
With the statute under discussion, we are not dealing with
a generally applicable statute, setting labor standards for city
government.

Neither are we dealing with the function that has

been removed from the jurisdiction or enabling power of a city to
perform.

Further, we are not dealing with a service which has

been assumed by state government and accountability for that
function preserved in the people through its elected officers.
Rather, Utah cities have been delegated the responsibility of
operating a fire department and establishing the terms and conditions of employment for all city employees.

Section 10-6-2 9,

Utah Code Ann. 1953, as amended•
Thus, even if one accepted appellants' position, his
argument fails because the Legislature has not removed these
areas from the ambit of a "municipal function."
Determining vacation time, deciding how many men should be
on a shift, establishing pay scales above minimum wage rates,
deciding whether men will work 8-hour or 24-hour shifts, and
other sundry issues concerning the terms and conditions of employment are "predominantly" of local concern.

As such, if local

self-government is to be preserved, the decision-making power
concerning these issues cannot be delegated to some non-elected
ad hoc commission.

See, City of Beaverton v. International

Ass'n of Fire Fighters, 531 P.2d 730, 731, id. and quoted supra
at p. 14. Our Constitution wisely guaranteed that these
"municipal functions," including the power to levy taxes for
them, could not be so delegated.
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Appellants collection of "policy reasons" on pages 14 through
19 of their brief, cannot abrogate the Utah Constitution, even if
they were meritorious.

Further, the "entirely obvious" policy

statements are not axioms; rather, it appears more reasonable to
the writer to conclude that the reasons stated are merely "make
weight" assertions invested by the appellants; they were never
issues considered by the Legislature when it hurriedly passed this
bill and a batch of other ill-considered legislation on the last
day of the session.
One must further observe that there is no issue in this case
of any Utah city attempting to avoid a state directed standard of
fire service, as may be inferred from page 15 of Appellants1 brief.
However, if Appellants1 brief is intended to suggest that a series of
non-elected, ad hoc arbitration panels are going to establish state
fire standards from this statute, the writer is even more seriously
concerned.

Certainly, there can be no serious dispute that establish-

ing these standards of fire service is a purely legislative function; further it is a policy decision that cannot be performed by
panels of arbitration commissioners. Aside from the fact it would
be an illegal legislative delegation without standards to govern
the delegee, this assertion is true because no uniform state policy
or standards could be expected from such arbitration panels, which
are separately and independently appointed for each Utah jurisdiction and for each separate contract impasse.
By advancing the policy argument of uniformity and of statewide fire protection standards, one is given a glimpse at the
broad scope of authority which the Union sponsors of this Legislation envisioned.

That scope as set forth in the policy reasons of
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Appellants1 brief is indeed frightening to those who respect
democratic processes.

In addition, it must be observed that the

suggested logical tie between a "method" of bargaining between
cities and their employees and the quality of fire protection
thereafter provided, is tenuous at best.
Other policy arguments advanced by appellants are likewise
suspect; however, for the sake of brevity the writer will only
further comment that "industrial peace" is not produced by
collective bargaining and binding arbitration.
"Compulsory Arbitration:

See, Laffe,',

The Australian Experience, "95 Monthly

Labor Rev, 45 (May, 1972); McAvoy, "Binding Arbitration of
Contract Terms: A new Approach to the Resolution of Disputes
in Public Sector," 72 Colum. L.Rev. 1192, 1212 (1972); Petro,
"Sovereignty and Public Sector Bargaining," 10 Wake Forest L.Rev.,
25-37 (1974).

•

It is submitted that the awesome, autocratic power of such
an arbitration commission, not only offends Utah cities1 constitutionally guaranteed right of self-government, but it fatally
wounds the democratic principles of representative government by
its unlawful delegation of legislative prerogatives, including
the power of tax.

It, therefore, should be declared unconsti-

tutional and the decision of the lower court affirmed.
POINT IB
EVEN IF THE DELEGATION OF LEGISLATIVE POWER TO AN
ARBITRATOR IS NOT UNCONSTITUTIONAL PER SE, SUCH
DELEGATION IS TOTALLY WITHOUT STANDARDS TO GUIDE
THE ARBITRATOR AND IS, THEREFORE, UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
Even if some degree of delegation is deemed permissible, it
is well established that legislative power cannot be delegated
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without providing sufficient standards to guide the delegee in
the exercise of that legislative authority.

The following is

representative of the holdings of many cases.
"'If no standards are set up to guide the administrative agency in the exercise of function conferred on it
by the legislature, the legislation is void as passing
beyond the legitimate bounds of delegation of legislative
power and as constituting a surrender and abdication to
an alien body of the power which the constitution confers
on the Senate and the General Assembly alone. Nowhere
in this act is there any guide furnished to the board of
arbitration other than that it shall arbitrate 'any and
all disputes then existing between the public utility
and the employees. . . .' City of Biddeford v. Biddeford
Teachers Ass'n, id at p. 399, citing with approval State
v. Traffic Telephone Workers Federation of New Jersey, 66
A.2d 616, 625-626 (N.J., 1949).
Regarding the establishment of a new social mechanism and using
ad hoc commissions as opposed to permanent administrative bodies,
this court said:
". . . (T)here is, thus an even greater need of specific
standards than there would be in the case of a continuous
administrative body which might gather experience as it
went along . . .
"Standards of delegation are peculiarly required, more
over, when the legislature is enacting a new pattern of
social conduct . . .'" City of Biddeford v. Biddeford
Teachers Ass'n, id. at p. 399, citing State v. Traffic
Telephone Workers Federation of New Jersey, 66 A.2d 616,
625-626 (N.J., 1949).
Even those decisions cited by appellants have supported the
requirement of specific standards for the arbitration panel.

For

example, the Rhode Island arbitration statute sets forth numerous
facts which "must" be considered by the arbitrators.

Among other

provisions the statute states:
" . . . the factors, among others to be given weight by
the arbitrators in arriving at a decision shall include:
(a) Comparison of wage rates or hourly conditions
of employment of the fire department in question with
prevailing wage rates or hourly conditions of employment of skilled employees of the building trades and
industry in the local operating area involved.
(b) Comparison of wage rates or hourly conditions
of employment of the fire department in question with
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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wage rates or hourly conditions of employment maintained
for the same or similar work of employees exhibiting
like or similar skills under the same or similar working
conditions in the local operating area involved.
(c) Comparison of wage rate or hourly conditions of
employment of the fire department in question with wage
rates or hourly conditions of employment of fire departments in cities or towns of comparable size,
(d)

Interest in welfare for the public.

(e) Comparison of peculiarities of employment in
regard to other trades or professions, specifically:
(1) Hazards in employment; (2) Physical qualifications; (3) Educational qualifications; (4) Mental
qualifications; (5) Job training and skills."
R.I. Gen. Laws, 1956, § 28-9.0-10 quoted in Providence v.
Local 7 99, International Ass'n of Firefighters, 305 A.2d
93 f (R.I., 1973); See also, n. 4 of Amsterdam v. Helsby,
332 N.E.2d 290, 299 (N.Y., 1975).
The New York Court of Appeals stated:
"A first and most important safeguard is, of course, the
provision of standards to confine the discretion of the
panel. Where we have invalidated delegations of power to
nonelected bodies, it was because such standards were
totally lacking. (citations omitted) . . . 'The Legislature may constitutionally confer discretion upon an administrative agency only if it limits the field in which that
discretion is to operate and provide standards to govern
its exercise;f . . ." City of Amsterdam v. Helsby, id. at
p. 299. (Emphasis added)
The New York Court thereafter found that there were specific
guidelines and therefore upheld the New York statute.
Utah has likewise consistently upheld the principal requiring
specific legislative guidelines for delegated authority.

The

leading Utah case is State v. Goss, 79 Ut. 559, 11 P.2d 340 (1932)
This case observed:
"The legislative power of the state is by the Constitution vested in the Legislature, and, under circumstances
therein specified, in the people of the state, and such
legislative power may not by the Legislature be delegated
to other agencies, except where expressly directed or
permitted by the Constitution. . . .
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"'Board and commissions now play an important part
in the administration of our laws. . . though legislative
power cannot be delegated to boards and commissions, the
legislature may delegate to them administrative functions
in carrying out the purposes of the statute and various
governmental powers for the more efficient administration
of our laws.'" 1 Cooley, Constitutional Administration
(8th Ed.) p. 231.
"'The legislature in enacting a law complete in itself,
designated to accomplish the regulation of particular matters
falling within its jurisdiction, may expressly authorize
an administrative commission within definite valid limits
to provide rules and regulations for the complete operation
and enforcement of the law within its expressed general
purpose. . . . (citations omitted)
"'The legislature may not delegate the power to enact a
law or declare what the law shall be, or to exercise an
unrestricted discretion in applying a law; but it may enact
a law complete in itself designed to accomplish the general
public purpose, and may expressly authorize designated
officials within definite valid limitation to provide rules
and regulations for the complete operation and enforcement
of the law within its expressed general purpose. . . .
"'. . . (I)n creating such an administrative agency, the
legislature to prevent its being a pure delegation of legislative power, must enjoin upon it a certain course of procedure and certain rules of decision in the performance of
its function.'" State v. Goss, id. at p. 341,, 342, citing
Wichita R. and L. Company v. Public Utilities Commission,
246 U.S. 48, 43 S.Ct. 51, 55, 67 L.Ed. 124; See also,
Revne v. Trade Commission, 113 Ut. 155, 192 P.2d 563 (1948).
(Emphasis added)
The Utah statute under consideration has absolutely no guidelines, standards or criteria which the arbitration commission may
use or which limit its discretion.

Each ad hoc arbitration panel

has total carte blanche authority to make any ruling and impose
any burden (at its unbridled discretion) that it may wish on a
Utah city.
It is respectfully submitted that the total absence of any
legislative standards or guidelines to limit the arbitrary power
of this commission, in and of itself, makes the Act unconstitutional.
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POINT II
THE FIREFIGHTER BINDING ARBITRATION STATUTE
IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL IN THAT IT VIOLATES BOTH
UTAH AND UNITED STATES CONSTITUTIONAL GUARANTEES OF EQUAL PROTECTION, DUE PROCESS OF LAW,
AND THE UTAH CONSTITUTIONAL PROHIBITION AGAINST
SPECIAL LAWS.
A. GRANTING APPROXIMATELY 350 MEMBERS OF THE
SALT LAKE CITY FIRE DEPARTMENT, RIGHTS, PRIVILEDGES AND IMMUNITIES NOT EQUALLY PROVIDED TO
THE OTHER APPROXIMATELY 400 MEMBERS OF THE SALT
LAKE CITY POLICE DEPARTMENT IS AN INVIDIOUS
DISCRIMINATION AND AN UNREASONABLE CLASSIFICATION.
Art. I, § 2, of the Utah Constitution provides:
"All political power is inherent in the people; and all
free governments are founded on their authority for their
equal protection and benefit, . . •"
Further, Art. I f § 24, of the Utah Constitution provides:
"All laws of a general nature shall have uniform
operation."
The case law relating to these two sections of the Utah Constitution clearly provides that laws must be uniform and that
classes of persons, for or against whom the laws will operatef
must be established on a rational basis.
must be reasonable and not arbitrary.

Such classification

That is, a law is invalid

if there exists no rational reason for excluding a class of individuals from this application.
A representative case illustrating this point is State v.
J. B. and R. E. Walker, Inc., 116 P.2d 766 (Ut., 1941).

In this

case, the Utah Supreme Court struck down a state statute penalizing employers who refused to pay wages due employees, but
excepted from this requirement banks and mercantile houses.

The

Court noted the classification problems and stated that the
classifications must be reasonable to survive a constitutional
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challenge.

Regarding this classification issuef the Court cor-

rectly summarized as follows:
"'In order to see whether the excluded classes or
transactions are on a different basis than those
included, we must look at the purpose of the act. The
objects and purposes of a law present the touchstone
from determining proper and improper classification.
"'It is only where some persons or transactions
excluded from the operation of the law are as to the
subject matter of the law in no differentiable class
from those included in its operation that the law is
discriminatory in the sense of being arbitrary and
unconstitutional. . . .'" State v. J. B. and R. E.
Walker, Inc., 116 P.2d 769, citing State v. Mason,
—
78 P.2d 920, 923, 924.
~
The Court further noted;
"'Before a court can interfere with the legislative
judgment, it must be able to say that there is no fair
reason for the law that would not require with equal
force its extension to others which it leaves untouched.1"
State v. J. B. and R. E. Walker, Inc., id. at p. 769,
citing 12 Am.Jur., § 521, p. 271.
Thereafter, the Court could find no justification for the exclusion of banks and mercantile houses from the labor bills; therefore, it held the statute constitutionally defective, as being
an arbitrary classification of the excluded classes.
Likewise, the writer is at a loss to find any basis (let
alone a reasonable basis) to treat the fire department personnel
differently on the procedural basis of dealing with their employer
than other city employees, particularly police department personnel.

It is respectfully submitted that even appellant has failed

to propound any factual or theoretical basis to justify this
legislatively preferred class which makes fire department personnel a preferred class by giving them exclusive procedures for
negotiating the terms and conditions of employment, other than
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asserting that they are firefighters and work 24 hour shifts.
Certainly, those distinctions create no basis for differentiating
the procedural mechanism whereunder they deal with the City on
negotiating wages or other terms and conditions of employment.
Thus, the statute is patently discriminatory and violative of
both Art. I, § 2, and Art. I, § 24, of the Utah Constitution.
These Utah constitutional provisions are also augumented
by the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution,
which guarantees equal protection under the law and has been
interpreted to prohibit invidious discrimination without reasonable classifications.

See, Sailors v. Board of Education, 387

U.S. 105, 111, 18 L.Ed.2d 650 (1967).

Experimentation of govern-

ment must cease when it runs afoul of a fundamental constitutional
right.

Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 336, 31 L.Ed.2d 274

(1972); San Antonio School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 34
(1973).
Of similar import is the constitutional provisions prohibiting
"Special Laws."

This provision provides:

"No private or special law shall be enacted where a
general law can be applicable." Art. VI, § 26, Utah
Constitution.
Again, in interpreting this section, this Court has held that
there must be a reasonable classification.

Any law which benefits

one special group of individuals without a reasonable classification is violative of this constitutional provision.

This court

has said:
"Courts are practically harmonious that, not only
cities, but many other subjects, may be classified without contravening the constitutional provision that fin
all cases where a general law can be applicable no special
law shall be enacted.1" Art. VI, (18), Const.; Board of
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It has also agreed that the classification must be reasonable
and natural, and not artificial or arbitrary.

In referring to

the question of classification, this Court has said:
"A. 'classification must be natural, not artificial.
It must stand upon some reason, having regard to the
character of the legislation." Board of Education v.
Hunter, 150 P. 1019, 1022, 1023 (Ut., 1916), citing
Edmonds v. Herbrandson, 50 N.W. 970.
Thereafter, the Court specifically held that a statute providing
for differing school tax assessments for different districts was
arbitrary and unreasonable.

It held:

"(W)hat we do hold is that where classifications are
adopted and limitations are imposed, the law must operate
and affect all within the same class substantially alike."
Board of Education v. Hunter, id. at p. 1024.
Again, the writer would be very interested in learning of
any distinction which makes the Salt Lake City employees working
in the fire department unique or distinguishable from any other
class of municipal employees, when it comes to issues concerning
labor negotiations.

There certainly can be no distinction between

fire department employees and police department employees and,
with regard to the question of collective bargaining, the writer
submits there are no reasonable distinctions between any city
employee.

The rights exclusively granted to some 350 of the City's

almost 1800 employees is clearly an arbitrary and capricious
classification; it must be held to be constitutionally defective.
B. THE PROVISIONS OF THE UTAH FIREFIGHTERS NEGOTIATION
ACT WHICH ATTEMPTS TO FORCE ALL OFFICERS OF THE FIRE
DEPARTMENT OF THE PLAINTIFF CITIES INTO A SINGLE BARGAINING UNIT, BUT WHICH EXCLUDES OFFICERS FROM BEING
A MEMBER OF THE BARGAINING TEAM IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
THIS PROVISION IS AN INVIDIOUS DISCRIMINATION AND AN
ARBITRARY UNREASONABLE CLASSIFICATION, AND A SPECIAL
LAW VIOLATING THESE OFFICERS1 CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS.
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The challenged statute defines the bargaining unit as the
entire City Fire Department; however, it provides that even
though the bargaining unit will bargain wages, hours and conditions of employment of all personnel in the Fire Department,
including officers, the negotiating team may not include those
officers.

It provides:

"The organization selected by a majority of the firefighters in an appropriate bargaining unit shall act as
the exclusive bargaining representative for all members
of the department. . . .
"No negotiating team of the established bargaining
unit is appropriate which includes any fire chief,
assistant chief, battalion or deputy chief, captain or
lieutenant." Sec. 34-20a-4, Utah Code Ann. 1953.
(Replacement Vol. 4B, 1975 Pocket Supp.)
Thus, although the rank and file firefighter can demand that the
officers be in the bargaining unit and negotiate for their wages,
salaries and working conditions, the officers, by law, are barred
from having a voice on the negotiating team.
This is the same situation as would occur if the Legislature
commanded that the Utah Court System hold a popular election to
select a Bargaining Unit, which unit would include judges,
clerks, bailiffs and other court support personnel.

By popular

vote this group could elect to be considered a bargaining unit
and include within their number the judges.

That group then

could negotiate wages, salaries and working conditions for all
of the court system (including judges), but by law, the judges
would be barred from being a member of the negotiating team and,
thus, from having a voice thereon.
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Aside from the serious policy consideration which places
management personnel and fire department officers in the same
bargaining unit as the rank and file firefighter, the exclusion
of officers from the negotiating team is a patently unreasonable
and arbitrary provision.

It denies those plaintiffs-respondents

Baker and Newman, as officers of the City Fire Department, equal
protection of the law and in effect disenfranchises them from
any representation concerning their interests.

For the reasons

-^ above stated in Point 11 A, the law should on its face be declared
unconstitutional.
Collaterally, it should be noted that such a provision is
extremely dangerous in that it leaves the plaintiff cities with
no management to direct reserve or volunteer firefighters in the
event of a job action or strike by the firefighters.

The position

is clearly a power play to rob City management of the fidelity
and loyalty of its management personnel in the firefighting service and, thereby, neuter city prerogatives in the event of a
strike or slow-down effectuated by the Firefighter Union.
At any rate, it is respectfully submitted that excluding
officers by law from negotiating team is a denial of due process
and equal protection of the laws.

It is patently an unreasonable

and arbitrary classification of exclusion of a group which should
never be part of a labor organization in the first instance.
POINT III
SINCE THE ARBITRATION PANEL HAS THE POWER TO DETERMINE THE DISPOSITION OF TAX MONEYS, IT HAS THE
POWER OF TAXATION; THEREFORE, THE NON-ELECTED
BINDING ARBITRATION PANEL VIOLATES THE ONE-PERSON
ONE-VOTE RULE OF THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION
AND ART. XI AND SECTION 5 OF THE UTAH CONSTITUTION.
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No principle is more firmly rooted in the fabric of American
life than that there shall be no taxation without representation.
Our Declaration of Independence lists as a grievance, taxation
without representation.

It declared to the world:

"He (King George) has combined with others to subject
us to a jurisdiction foreign to our constitution, and
unacknowledged by our laws; giving as his assent to their
acts of pretended legislation . . • for imposing taxes
on us without our consent." Declaration of Independence,]
As previously documented in the Findings of Fact and Point I
above, the arbitration panel

authorized in the subject law,

clearly has the power to compel the levying of taxes or altering the service level. A binding arbitration award on the
contract already pending before Salt Lake City could require
the hiring of 145 additional personnel and the imposition of
approximately

3 million dollars in additional taxes per year

on Salt Lake City residents.

(See, Statement of Fact 4, 5

and 8).
The Utah Constitution specifically granted to municipal corporations the power to tax and spend its revenues, consistent
with the general philosophy of a democratic representative government wisely created by the founding fathers.

This provision

provides as follows:
"The power to be conferred upon the cities by this
section shall include the following:
11

(a) To levy, assess and collect taxes and borrow
money, within the limits prescribed by general law, and
to levy and collect special assessments for benefits
conferred.
"(b) To furnish all local public service, . . .
"(c) To make local public improvements and to acquire
by condemnation, or otherwise, property within its corporate limits necessary for such improvements; . . . "
Art. XI,
Sec.
5, Utah
see
also,
Art. XI,
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Clearly, the constitutional framers intended to vest in elected
officials, exclusive control over the collection and distribution
of tax monies, together with the power to decide what local
services and the manner in which they would he delivered.

The

statute under consideration patently violates the basic tenets
of our constitutional democracy.
In addition to the foregoing, it is to be noted that a
person may not be disenfranchised from his right to vote on
matters of taxation and other matters relating to the operation
of government^ either by malaportioned legislatures which delute
that vote or through invidious discrimination based on wealth.
In furtherance of that guarantee of a meaningful ballot, at
least one court has held that a binding arbitration panel vio-*
lates the equal protection doctrine of the Fourteenth Amendment;
it held that such an ad hoc, non-elected panel of arbitrators
abridge the one-person, one-vote rule.

Judge Harold R. Soden
•

*

correctly noted:
"The one-person, one-vote principle is now clearly
applicable to local governmental units. . . .", citations omitted; City of Amsterdam v. Helsby, 362 N.Y.
Supp.2d 698 (N.Y., 1974).
Referring to the New York binding arbitration panel there under
discussion, this Judge noted:
"It is obvious that citizens do not have an equal
say in the composition of the panel and, furthermore,
that the inequality presented here is an unconstitutional deviation from the requirement of substantial
equality of representation."
He then quoted from Grey v. Sanders, 373 U.S. 389, 381 (1973)
to note that:
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" . . . once a state has decided to use a process of
popular election, and once 'the class of voters is
chosen and the qualifications specified, we see no constitutional way by which equality of voting power may
be evaded.1" City of Amsterdam v. Helsby, id. at p. 24.
That Court thereafter noted:
"The power the public arbitration panel does have is
the power of taxation because it has the power to determine the disposition of tax moneys. Since it does have
the power of taxation, under the New York precedent that
considered Baker v. Carr, (369 U.S. 186), and progeny
that this court has cited above, equality and representation is required for this legislative body." City of
Amsterdam v. Helsby, id. at p.24.
Thus, the court held the binding arbitration provision of this
law to be an unconstitutional infringement of the one-vote, oneman rule and violative of the taxation without representation
concept —

the principle upon which American system of democracy

is founded.

Even though this case was subsequently reversed, the

writer suggests that its logic stands.
v. Helsby, supra, at p. 24.

See, City of Amsterdam

'

As previously stated, the Utah binding arbitration panel would
purport to divest the elected of their powers concerning disposition of tax money, compel in some situations the imposition of
taxes or the elimination or modification of city services.

In a

very real sense, the panel could determine the type, quantity and
quality of services provided in Utah cities.

Thus, the binding

arbitration panel in effect disenfranchises the voters of Salt
Lake City and the other municipal corporation parties-plaintiff
to this litigation.

Therefore, it is clearly an unconstitutional

attempt to deny the electorate their franchise and the responsibility of the elected officials to perfom their constitutional
functions.
ruled.

Thus, the bill is unconstitutional and should be so
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POINT IV
THE BINDING AND COMPULSORY ARBITRATION PROVISIONS
OF THE UTAH FIREFIGHTERS NEGOTIATION ACT ARE NOT
SEVERABLE; THEREFORE, THE ENTIRE ACT MUST BE
DECLARED UNCONSTITUTIONAL.,
Courts which have considered the severability issue have
frequently voided entire statutes. This fact is true even where
severability clauses were included, if the unconstitutional provisions were interrelated and interdependent with the rest of
the law.

This Court has succinctly stated:

"This court has previously held that even where a
savings clause existed, where the provisions of the
statute are interrelated, it is not within the scope
of this court's function to select valid portions of
the act and conjecture that they should stand independently of the portions which are invalid." State v.
Salt Lake City, 21 Ut.2d 318, 445 P.2d 691, 696 (1968).
This court has further reasoned in striking down an entire statute,
despite the existence of a severability clause, that:
". . . (the law) is invalid, and the severability clause,
enacted in 1961 is ineffective, because of the dependency
of the remaining sections upon the provisions declared
inoperative,11 Carter v. Beaver County Service Area Act No.
JL, 16 Ut.2d 280, 399 P.2d 440, 442 (1965). See also, Pride
Oil Co. v. Salt Lake County, 13 Ut.2d 183, 370 P.2d 355,
357 (1962). (Emphasis added)
In considering a virtually identical problem presented by
the case presently before the bar, the South Dakota Supreme Court
struck down that State's entire public employee collective bargaining statute.

It held the binding arbitration features of it

unconstitutional and then noted:
". . . This court has consistently upheld 'any phase
of the measure if the Legislature would have enacted
that much without the part the constitution rejects.1
(citations omitted).
"This court must agree that (the binding arbitration
statute) and the remainder of the act is so bound to the
total concept of binding arbitration to be considered other
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than wholly interdependent. Certainly, within constitutional limits, the provisions of SDCL 3-18, which
governs grievance procedures of public, would be made
confusing by retention of the remaining sections of
SDCL 9-14A. Clearly, the legislature would not have
adopted this provision in direct conflict with other
law had they known that SDCL 9-14A-18 would be declared
void. .We must declare the whole of the chapter as unconstitutional." (citations omitted) City of Sioux
Falls v. Firefighters Local 814, id. at p. 5.
Likewise, the statute under consideration and its features
of arbitration are so inexerably intertwined with the whole statute
that it cannot be subject to a reasonable severance.

This court

would be left to guess at the legislative intent; therefore, the
decision of the lower court should be affirmed and the entire
statute declared unconstitutional.
CONCLUSION
The Utah Fire Fighters1 Negotiations Act is patently unconstitutional.
1.

Specifically, the law:

Attempts to set up a special commission through a board

of arbitrators, which board is purportedly authorized to perform
the municipal functions of effectively determining the level,
quantity, quality and type of service that can be performed by
Utah municipal corporations; this control is obtained by the
Legislature granting binding power to set the terms and conditions
of employment for city fire department personnel in an ad hoc
commission.

As such, the arbitration provision is clearly a vio-

lation of Art. VI, § 29, of the Utah Constitution.
2.

The binding arbitration provision of the statute is a

clear delegation of legislative functions, including the power
to tax, spend tax revenue, and determine the level, quality,
quantity andDigitized
type
of services to be provided to residents of
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incorporated areas.

Thus, it violates the Fourteenth Amendment

of the United States Constitution and the Equal Protection provision guaranteeing the right of the electorate to control its
government through the electorial process.

Further, the dis-

enfranchising of the voter and the delegation of these functions
to a board of arbitrators also violates provisions of Article
XI, Section 5, of the Utah Constitution which guarantees these
rights to remain in elected officials.
3.

The bill illegally delegates legislative functions.

4.

Even accepting the delegation as legal, it is constitu-

tionally defective because there are no guidelines

or standards

to govern the use of the delegated authority.
5.

The bill arbitrarily establishes an unreasonable and

arbitrary classification which invidiously discriminates against
others similarly situated.

Without any rational reason, the

bill applies exclusively to Utah firemen, to the exclusion of
Utah police officers and other employees of both the State and
City governments.

Further, the bill purports to force (by

popular vote) officers of the City Fire Department into the same
bargaining unit with firefighters; yet, without reason, the law
bars those same officers from being members of the bargaining
team.

As such, the bill constitutes a special law and violates

the due process clause and the equal protection clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, together
with the similar provisions of the Utah Constitution.
6.

The binding arbitration provision of this statute and

the provision excluding officers from the bargaining team is so
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interdependent and connected with the rest of the statute as to
be nonseverable.

Therefore, the entire bill must be declared

unconstitutional in toto.
It is, therefore, respectfully submitted that the Court
uphold the lower court and rule that the entire statute under
discussion is unconstitutional and void.
Respectfully submitted,

ROGER F. CUTLER
Attorney for Plaintiffs-Respondents
101 City and County Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
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34-20a-3. Fire fighters' right to bargain collectively.—Fire fighters
have the right to bargain collectively about wages, hours, and other conditions of employment with corporate authorities and to be represented
in such negotiations by a bargaining representative chosen by such fire
fighters.
History: L. 1975, ch. 102, § 3.

34-20a^4. Exclusive bargaining representative—Selection—Exclusions
from negotiating team.—The organization selected by a majority of fire
fighters in an appropriate bargaining unit shall act as the exclusive bargaining representative for all members of the department until recognition of such bargaining representative is withdrawn by a vote of a majority
of the fire fighters in the department. No negotiating team of the established bargaining unit is appropriate which includes any fire chief, assistant chief, battalion or deputy chief, captain or lieutenant.
History: I*. 1975, ch. 102, § 4.

34-20a-5. Corporate authority duty—Collective bargaining agreement
—No-strike clause.—It is the duty of any corporate authority to meet
and collectively bargain in good faith with the bargaining representative
within ten days after receipt of written notice from such representative
that it represents a majority of the employees in the bargaining unit. No
collective bargaining agreement shall be executed for a period of more than
two years. Each bargaining agreement shall contain a no-strike clause.
History: lu 1975, ch. 102, § 5.

34-20a-6, Notice of request for collective bargaining—Time.—Whenever wages, rates of pay, or any other matter requiring appropriation of
money by any city, town or county are included as a matter of collective
bargaining conducted under this act, it is the obligation of the bargaining
representative to serve written notice of request for collective bargaining
vu the corporate authorities at least 120 days before the last day on which
funds can be appropriated to cover the contract period which is the subject
of collective bargaining.
History: I.. 1975, ch. 102, §6.

34-20a-7. Arbitration.—If the bargaining representative and the corporate authorities are unable to reach an agreement within thirty days
after negotiations, all unresolved issues shall be submitted to arbitration.
History: L. 1975, ch. 102, § 7.

34-20a-8. Procedure for arbitration.—If no agreement is reached within the period prescribed by section 34-20a-7, each party within five days
after the expiration of such period shall name one individual to serve as
an arbitrator. Each party shall furnish written notification of the name
and address of its arbitrator. The two arbitrators within ten days after
their selection shall make application to the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service for a list of seven names from which they shall name the
third arbitrator who shall serve as chairman of the arbitration panel. The
third arbitrator shall be chosen within five days after receipt of the list
of arbitrators from the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service with
each party alternately striking one name until six names are stricken.
The remaining unstricken name shall serve as the third member of *he
arbitration panel. Formal arbitration shall commence within four days
after selection of the third arbitrator.
History: L. 1975, ch. 102, § 8.

34-20a-9. Board of arbitration—Determination—Final and binding—
Exception—Expense.—The determination of the majority of the board
of arbitration thus established shall be final and binding on all matters in
dispute except in salary or wage matters which shall be considered ad
visory
only.
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